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Chapter 7
Metacognition As Evidence
for Evidentialism
Matthew Frise
Abstract Metacognition is the monitoring and controlling of cognitive processes.
I examine the role of metacognition in ‘ordinary retrieval cases’, cases in which
it is intuitive that via recollection the subject has a justified belief. Drawing on
psychological research on metacognition, I argue that evidentialism has a unique,
accurate prediction in each ordinary retrieval case: the subject has evidence for
the proposition she justifiedly believes. But, I argue, process reliabilism has no
unique, accurate predictions in these cases. I conclude that ordinary retrieval cases
better support evidentialism than process reliabilism. This conclusion challenges
several common assumptions. One is that non-evidentialism alone allows for a
naturalized epistemology, i.e., an epistemology that is fully in accordance with
scientific research and methodology. Another is that process reliabilism fares much
better than evidentialism in the epistemology of memory.
Keywords Metacognition · Memory · Naturalized epistemology · Ordinary
retrieval · Reliabilism
7.1 Introduction
Evidentialism roughly is the view that an attitude for a subject toward a propo-
sition is justified just when the attitude fits the subject’s total evidence.1 Many
philosophers think that a chief rival to evidentialism is process reliabilism (hereafter
reliabilism). Reliabilism states roughly that a belief is justified just in case it results
from a reliable belief formation process, that is, a process that tends to yield
1See Feldman and Conee (1985).
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true beliefs rather than false beliefs.2 In this paper I defend an argument favoring
evidentialism over reliabilism:
Retrieval Argument
P1. Evidentialism has a unique, accurate prediction in ordinary retrieval cases.
P2. It is not the case that reliabilism has a unique, accurate prediction in ordinary retrieval
cases.
P3. If in cases X, H1 but not H2 has a unique, accurate prediction, then cases X support H1
better than H2.
C. Ordinary retrieval cases support evidentialism better than reliabilism.
Let’s clarify terms. A prediction, here, is a proposition that a theory (at least when
paired with auxiliary hypotheses) entails, and yet this theory was not designed to
entail it. A unique prediction is a proposition that one theory (and its auxiliary
hypotheses) entails but which a specified rival theory does not entail. In Sect. 7.2
I will explain exactly what an ordinary retrieval case is. For now, think of it as a
case in which it is intuitive to any non-skeptical epistemologist that a subject, upon
recollecting information related to p, has a belief that p that is memorially justified.
Not all cases of recollection fit this description. In cases where the recollecting
subject has forgotten a defeater for p, for example, it is controversial whether the
subject’s belief that p is memorially justified.3 But all non-skeptical epistemologists
want their theory of justification to imply that the subject’s belief in an ordinary
retrieval case is justified.
The conclusion of the Retrieval Argument is modest. It does not propose that, all
things considered, we should endorse evidentialism over reliabilism. It proposes that
certain cases count in favor of evidentialism rather than reliabilism. I will defend P1
and P2 by looking at research on the role of metacognition during memory retrieval.
First (in Sect. 7.2) I discuss this role, and then (in Sects. 7.3 and 7.4) I support each
premise. I do not defend P3 here, as it is uncontroversial.4
But why should we care about my argument, given its modest conclusion?
Here are three reasons. The reasons reveal that a successful defense of even
just P1 or P2 is significant. First, allegedly, externalism is much friendlier to a
naturalized epistemology than internalism is. Internalism is the view that epistemic
justification supervenes on the mental; no feature in a subject’s environment affects
2See Goldman (1979). For two reasons, evidentialism and reliabilism are not in fact direct rivals.
First, they theorize about different things. Evidentialism states conditions that justify a subject
in having a doxastic attitude (propositional justification), and reliabilism states conditions in
which a subject’s doxastic attitude is justified (doxastic justification). With supplements, however,
each does state conditions about both propositional and doxastic justification. Second, once
supplemented, they can remain compatible (see Sect. 7.4). For simplicity, I take evidentialism
and reliabilism to be direct rivals here.
3Feldman (2005: 282–3) and McGrath (2007: 4) argue that there can be memorial justification in
such cases. Annis (1980: 325–6), Goldman (2009: 324), and Greco (2005: 266–8) argue otherwise.
4P3 follows from strong predictivism, from weak predictivism, and from the likelihood principle.
See Harker (2013) and McCain (2012) for discussion of weak predictivism in epistemology.
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her justification without affecting her mental life.5 All justifying features are mental.
Externalism is the denial of internalism. The sort of evidentialism I support here is
internalist, while reliabilism is externalist.
According to Hilary Kornblith (2007: 51) certain data from cognitive psychology
in particular threaten internalism. Even some philosophers who try to show that
there is some affinity between internalism and naturalized epistemology, grant
that there is this threat.6 According to John Greco (2010: 61), the data threaten
evidentialism specifically. Also, according to Kornblith (2007: 44), the typical
manner of constructing externalist theories of justification is “thoroughly natural-
istic” (cf. Kitcher (1992: 3)); externalist methodology resembles our investigation
of natural kinds, in that it investigates not merely our concept of justified belief
but the characteristics underlying actual beliefs that are clearly justified. Since
Kornblith cites this credential on behalf of externalism, presumably he thinks
internalism lacks it. Alston (2004: 50) goes so far as to claim that the “rise of
externalism” is in part explained by its naturalistic methodology. If the Retrieval
Argument succeeds, however, important data from cognitive psychology support a
form of internalism over a leading externalist theory. What’s more, externalism’s
naturalistic methodology may help the Retrieval Argument succeed. Philosophers
in favor of naturalizing epistemology will have less reason to prefer externalism
over internalism.
Second, allegedly, internalism and evidentialism fare poorly in the epistemology
of memory, while externalism and reliabilism do well.7 Joëlle Proust (2013:
Chap. 9) uses data on metacognition in memory in particular to support this
allegation, and her arguments have actually influenced some psychologists.8 Other
philosophers and psychologists, when discussing metacognition, simply assume
that some form of externalism is correct.9 My support for P1 helps undermine
the allegation against internalism and evidentialism. Also, the Retrieval Argument
suggests that philosophers and psychologists should take internalism more seriously
when exploring research on metacognition, and that this research in some cases
supports internalism better. Internalism in the epistemology of memory becomes
safer.
Third, my support for my argument importantly develops evidentialism and
reliabilism. Conee and Feldman (2008: 93) count memory as a source of evidence,
5Conee and Feldman (2001). Some internalists would add that all justifiers are specially accessible
by their subjects. The variety of evidentialism I defend here is compatible with, but does not entail,
this addition.
6See, e.g., Wheeler and Pereira (2008: 317). Feldman (1999), however, argues that data from
cognitive psychology is much less important to epistemological theorizing than many philosophers
suppose.
7See Bernecker (2008, 2010), Goldman (1999, 2009, 2011), Greco (2005), Plantinga (1993) and
Senor (2010). Cf. Frise (2017). For replies see Frise (2015, 2018) and Conee and Feldman (2001).
8Proust’s arguments, for example, have influenced Koriat and Adiv (2012: 1611).
9For philosophers, see Dokic (2014) and Michaelian (2012). For psychologists, see Reber and
Unkelbach (2010).
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but note that “Details about [it] and general theories about how [it works] would be
extremely valuable.” They say memory provides justification “only when a suitable
background is in place. Exactly what constitutes that background is a difficult matter
we will not attempt to resolve here. Whatever that background is, it is a matter of
evidence”. My defense of P1 helps complete evidentialism, theorizing about how
memory works and about what this background consists partly in.
And my defense of P2 uncovers general problems for reliabilism. Reliabilism
may lead to a kind of skepticism. Further, reliabilism’s overall testability turns out to
be surprisingly limited. Reliabilism has not in fact already gathered all the trophies
in the epistemology of memory.
7.2 Metacognition in Memory
An ordinary retrieval case is one in which it is uncontroversial that a subject justi-
fiedly believes that p after having a recollective experience related to p. Additionally,
this justification is memorial rather than, say, perceptual or testimonial. There are
different accounts of why there is memorial justification in these cases.10 I remain
neutral on them. Since there is memory justification outside of ordinary retrieval
(e.g. for some non-occurrent beliefs), I am not commenting on memory justification
simpliciter here.
In order to see what evidentialism and reliabilism do and don’t accurately predict
in ordinary retrieval cases, we should first see what these cases are like. Suppose
Smith, a typical American adult, is asked, “Who was the first postmaster general of
the United States?”, and Smith thinks and has certain experiences, and then reports
p, namely, that Benjamin Franklin was the first postmaster general of the United
States. Let all of this happen in a fairly normal way, such that we find it intuitive
that Smith believes that p justifiedly. What of interest occurred between the asking
and the reporting? To answer this, we needn’t merely appeal to armchair intuitions
or personal experience. We can look at psychological research on metacognition in
memory.
Metacognition is the monitoring and controlling of cognitive processes.11 Cog-
nition allows us to read the road signs outside the mind. Metacognition allows
us to decipher some signs within. In an ordinary retrieval case, an information-
producing cognitive mechanism (unsurprisingly) produces information, and both
the information and its production are monitored. This monitoring is typically
unconscious but becomes conscious in certain circumstances (when, for example,
10Annis (1980), Bernecker (2008), and Goldman (1999, 2009, 2011) say memory merely preserves
the justification from the past. Audi (1995), Conee and Feldman (2011), and Huemer (1999) say
recollective experience sometimes generates some justification.
11On the psychological claims below, see Koriat (2002), Koriat and Helstrup (2007), and
Unkelbach (2007). Arango-Muñoz (2013a, b), Arango-Muñoz and Michaelian (2014), Michaelian
(2012), Nagel (manuscript), and Proust (2013) guide my interpretation of the psychology.
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there is any of a variety of difficulties in processing). The monitoring involves
and gives rise to an epistemic feeling.12 It’s controversial just what an epistemic
feeling is. At minimum, it is a phenomenal, affective, non-emotional experience
with intentional content. All epistemic feelings have these features, though other
mental states might have them all too. What is special about an epistemic feeling
is that it gives feedback having to do with cognitive processing. Examples of such
feelings include feelings of knowing, of familiarity, of uncertainty, and of forgetting.
The type of epistemic feeling elicited is determined by the features detected in
both the information and its production. Detecting scant or undetailed information
is more likely to elicit a feeling of uncertainty, while detecting a glut of detailed
information is more likely to elicit the feeling of knowing—even before that detailed
information is consciously accessed.
An endorsement mechanism then evaluates the type of feeling, the features
detected in monitoring, and certain of the subject’s background beliefs. In light of
the evaluation, the endorsement mechanism controls the information-processing.
This control either terminates or permits the retrieving of information. Control
can initiate a different strategy for accessing the target information (e.g., using
a different heuristic, looking the information up via an external source). The
endorsement mechanism controls whether the subject endorses (i.e., occurrently
believes) or suspends judgment regarding the retrieved information.13 Typically
the subject’s epistemic feelings determine the subject’s confidence in anything that
becomes endorsed. A feeling of knowing correlates with higher confidence, while a
mild feeling of uncertainty does not.
Smith’s ordinary retrieval, for example, begins with unconscious information-
production. Monitoring this information results in his having an epistemic feeling,
like the feeling of knowing. This feeling precedes his endorsing p, and his producing
p consciously. Next, Smith experiences fluent retrieval of p. That is, he might expe-
rience retrieving p relatively quickly; or, he might experience retrieving information
corroborating p; or, p might persist for a relatively long while or occur frequently
in his thoughts. Or, some combination might occur. Smith will have learned to
interpret (automatically and unreflectively) this experience of fluently retrieving p
as p’s being familiar. As a result of monitoring, an endorsement mechanism will
exert control. Smith will endorse p and cease his inquiry, and his confidence in p
will be high, given the high fluency of his retrieval experience. This completes his
ordinary retrieval.
12Alternatively dubbed a noetic feeling (Proust 2013) and metacognitive feeling (Arango-Muñoz
2013b).
13Michaelian (2012: 288–90) assumes that one of these propositional attitudes is thereby formed.
But it could be that the attitude was standing and just becomes occurrent.
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7.3 Evidentialism
I have described an ordinary retrieval case. What might evidentialism accurately
predict here? The defense of P1 begins with answering this. But answering requires
us to get clearer on what evidentialism entails in any case of justified belief.
According to evidentialism, if the justified attitude for S toward p is belief, then S’s
evidence supports p. Belief is the justified attitude for S toward p in an ordinary
retrieval case. So, evidentialism entails that S has evidence for p. So long as
evidentialism was not designed to entail this in ordinary retrieval cases, it counts
as a prediction.
But what is evidence, and what is it for something to be evidence for p? Different
versions of evidentialism answer these questions differently. On the version I
discuss here—explanationist evidentialism—S’s evidence includes S’s experiences.
The propositions supported by the evidence are the ones that are part of the best
explanation available to S for why S has that evidence. For instance, for a typical
adult, a reddish visual experience typically is for her evidence that something is red.
This is because, on the best explanation of her experience available to her, something
is red. She need not have assessed, or even ever thought about, this explanation
or any other. It just must be the best available to her. I won’t defend a theory of
availability. I’ll assume simply that p is part of the best explanation available to S
for why she has certain evidence if the following is true: S is disposed to have a
seeming that p is part of the best answer as to why she has that evidence.14
Now what, if anything, does evidentialism accurately predict in ordinary retrieval
cases? It predicts that Smith, for instance, will have evidence for p (i.e., that
Benjamin Franklin was the first postmaster general of the United States). More
generally:
Candidate 0. In each ordinary retrieval case, the proposition justifiedly believed by the
subject is part of the best explanation available to her for why she has her experiences.
Is this prediction accurate? Some philosophers would suggest not. Plantinga (1993:
62–4) considers our potential evidence for our memory beliefs, slipping back
and forth between talking about ‘present phenomena’, ‘phenomenal imagery’, and
‘beliefs about the present’. This evidence is either too rare or feeble to be what
actually justifies our memory beliefs. He (1993: 188) concludes “There is nothing
we can sensibly think of as evidence on the basis of which [a] memory belief
is formed,” because he seems to think we have no justifying evidence for the
content of our memory beliefs.15 Greco (2010: 61) concurs (cf. Bernecker (2010:
14McCain (2014: 65–70) defends the assumption about availability. Cf. Conee and Feldman (2008:
97–98).
15Apparently Plantinga assumes that a memory belief is based on evidence only if it is currently
formed on the basis of conscious evidence. This overlooks the possibility that these memory beliefs
were formed in the past and that currently they are just activated, and the possibility that their
evidential bases are mental but non-conscious.
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73)). If Plantinga and Greco are right, and if explanationist evidentialism correctly
characterizes evidential support, then Candidate 0 is inaccurate. The subject in an
ordinary retrieval case lacks evidence (from memory, at least) for her belief, since it
is a memory belief.
However, Plantinga’s survey of the potential evidence in ordinary retrieval cases
is not exhaustive. He does not consider all ‘present phenomena’. As I interpret
the research on metacognition, Candidate 0 is accurate. Consider Smith. He has
evidence, and it is evidence for p. His evidence includes (a) his epistemic feelings
that bear on p (e.g., his feeling of knowing), (b) his experience of fluently retrieving
p, and (c) his experience of automatically interpreting the fluently retrieved infor-
mation as familiar.
Here is why (a), (b), and (c) are evidence for p: on the best explanation available
to Smith of why these phenomena obtain, p is true. When asked, “who was the
first postmaster general of the United States?”, Smith could have experienced fluent
retrieval of indefinitely many propositions other than p and had an associated feeling
of knowing. Or, Smith could have retrieved nothing at all. On the best available
explanation to Smith for why he experienced fluent retrieval or had a feeling of
knowing regarding p in particular, Smith once learned p or some nontrivial support
for p. Smith’s memory supports this. As far as Smith is able to tell, what his
feelings of knowing indicate is often correct and reasonable, not contentious. Also,
that the feeling of knowing is a guide to the truth coheres well with Smith’s other
experiences, and with the fact that those experiences do not, from his perspective,
tend to mislead.
A proposition that a subject fluently retrieves has likely been processed by that
subject before. The fluency results from a kind of practice at processing. All else
being equal, a previously processed proposition on a matter is more likely true than
an incompatible unfamiliar one. The best available explanation of Smith’s fluently
retrieving p includes one or several previous representations to him of p as true—
perhaps initially via testimony, then via further testimony, and then via recollection,
and so on. There is only one true proposition about who the first postmaster general
was, and indefinitely many falsehoods. Other things being equal, a proposition
represented on multiple occasions as true is more likely true than false, in part
since (roughly) a truth on the matter is more likely to be reencountered than a given
falsehood is. Any number of falsehoods could be encountered, and so each is less
likely to be reencountered than the truth is.16
And, part of the best available explanation of Smith’s experience of automati-
cally interpreting fluency as familiarity is that he has learned, perhaps unreflectively,
this normally gets at the truth; whatever Smith fluently retrieves is likely true, and
familiarity flags that truth-connection for Smith. Given what Smith can recollect
and that Smith can tell that he is fairly normal and rational, he has reason to
believe that his automatically interpreting fluency as familiarity results from good
habituation. So on the best available explanation of Smith’s experience of the
automatic interpretation, p is true, since p feels familiar.
16Cf. Reber and Unkelbach (2010).
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The best explanations available to Smith of (a), (b), and (c)—individually, but
also together—include p. They are best because they are more parsimonious or
explanatorily powerful than the alternatives omitting p’s truth. Here are some
alternatives: Smith feels he knows any proposition that comes to mind. Smith
is disposed to have feelings of knowing toward propositions he typically never
learned in the past. Smith fluently retrieves propositions independently of what
he has learned or had reason to believe. Smith at random automatically interprets
phenomena as familiarity. He never learned, as a way of getting the truth, to interpret
fluency as familiarity. As they stand, these alternative kinds of explanations are ad
hoc and not very powerful. They suggest that subjects in ordinary retrieval cases are
typically misremembering. They leave it mysterious to Smith why he has managed
to survive, to live a normal life, to cooperate with others and agree with them about
the past, and to have a highly coherent set of experiences overall. They incline
us to doubt that Smith’s belief is justified even though, by stipulation of his case
being ordinary retrieval, it is justified. The alternative explanations can become more
explanatorily powerful only by sacrificing simplicity. They can posit ad hoc reasons
for his surviving, cooperating, and experiencing coherently. But the reasons bloat
the explanation. The commonsensical explanations that include the truth of p are
better. So, Smith has evidence for p. Again, Smith need not have worked out how p
is part of what best explains (a), (b), and (c). This best explanation simply must be
available to him.17
More could be said in direct support of my claim that the best available explana-
tion of (a), (b), and (c) includes p, but this sketch will suffice for now. If, as I claim,
evidentialism accurately predicts Candidate 0, then we are halfway to establishing
P1. To establish P1 we now just need to show that this prediction is unique, i.e., that
reliabilism does not share it. The next section considers reliabilism’s predictions.
First, a worry. Joëlle Proust doubts that a view she calls “internalism” explains
how metacognition could play a justificatory role. Yet I’ve claimed that metacogni-
tion plays this role on an evidentialist internalism. Proust and I pick out importantly
different views with “internalism”, but it’s still worth deflating the doubt. She (2013,
198–200) correctly notes that a subject’s environment and past largely influence
whether her epistemic feelings are reliable. She (2013, 200) says: “One can thus
conclude that the existence and reliability of epistemic feelings supervene in part
on the existence and quality of the feedback provided. Therefore, the internalist
17For inchoate explanatory theories of memorial support, see Harman (1973: 189) and Peacocke
(1986: 163–4). Jennifer Nagel (manuscript) argues that something like (c)—the interpretation of
fluency as familiarity—is available to internalist accounts of the justification of “trivia beliefs”.
She says (manuscript: 2) a belief is a trivia belief “if and only if (1) its origin lies in testimony
from a source whose identity is now unknown to the subject, and (2) the subject lacks topically
related auxiliary beliefs that would suffice to support the target belief”. My proposals go well
beyond Nagel’s. I discuss justification in ordinary retrieval cases, which often involve non-trivia
beliefs. Also, Nagel does not argue that (a) or (b) helps justify, and she (manuscript: 19) thinks (c)
itself justifies only “weakly”. And, I state in detail why (c), on explanationist evidentialism, helps
account for the relevant justification. Finally, I show that research on metacognition supports an
internalist view better than a main externalist rival.
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case for epistemic feelings as a source of epistemic intuition considerably loses in
explanatory force and credibility.” She seems to mean that having relevant epistemic
feelings is insufficient for having justification. Rather, epistemic feelings justify only
in environments where they are reliable. So, she concludes that metacognition is
uncongenial to internalism.
An unstated premise here is that any justifier is reliable. That is why, on Proust’s
view, epistemic feelings do not justify in environments where they are unreliable. If
there were reason to accept her premise, her conclusion would be hard to deny.
However, it would then be unremarkable that metacognition is uncongenial to
internalism. This is because, if her unstated premise were true, then internalism
would be false. Internalism would tell the wrong sort of story about justification,
since it omits environmental reliability constraints. There would be nothing special
about internalism incorrectly explaining justification from metacognition. Now, one
thing we should not do when evaluating how internalism and metacognition fit is
assume that internalism is false. Proust’s evaluation requires that very assumption.
So, we may set it aside.
7.4 Reliabilism
I will examine some leading candidates for what reliabilism might accurately,
uniquely predict in ordinary retrieval cases. We will find nothing suitable. This will
sufficiently support P2. I will then examine whether reliabilism predicts Candidate
0. We will find it does not. This will complete the defense of P1. Along the way we
will uncover some general problems for reliabilism. I am silent on many details of
reliabilism, so that the Retrieval Argument applies to any version of it.
It may seem obvious that reliabilism predicts:
Candidate 1. In each ordinary retrieval case the relevant process that forms the subject’s
justified belief is reliable.
The justified belief is formed by indefinitely many types of processes, and some of
these processes are reliable and some aren’t. The relevant process is the one whose
reliability determines whether the particular belief is justified. But reliabilism does
not predict Candidate 1. For there is a wrinkle to reliabilism.
Reliabilists distinguish belief-dependent and belief-independent belief formation
processes. A belief-dependent process (e.g., an inferential process) includes beliefs
among its inputs. A belief-independent process (e.g., a basic perceptual process)
does not. Many belief-dependent processes are unreliable, yet they still have the
virtue of being conditionally reliable—they satisfy the following:
CR1. A process R is conditionally reliable iff R mostly produces true beliefs when all of
R’s belief inputs are true.18
18Comesaña (2010: 577), Goldman (2011: 278n.20), and Lyons (2013: 9) endorse CR1.
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And reliabilists hold that the output of a belief-dependent conditionally reliable
belief formation process is justified if the belief inputs to that process are justified.
So, for example, belief in the conclusion of some reasoning is justified if all the
premises are justifiedly believed and the type of reasoning typically yields true
beliefs when the premises are true.
Now, in a typical adult human, if a process involves memory and metacognition
in the formation of a belief that p, that process is belief-dependent. It has belief
inputs. These include past beliefs with content relevantly similar to p or bearing
on p, beliefs about how memory works, about memory experience, about epistemic
feelings, about the feeling of familiarity, and so on. The belief-dependent nature
of memory processing actually helped inspire Goldman’s (1979: 13) notion of
conditional reliability, shaping his original statement of reliabilism. So, reliabilism
doesn’t predict Candidate 1. Consider instead:
Candidate 2. In each ordinary retrieval case the relevant process that forms the subject’s
justified belief is conditionally reliable.
If reliabilism predicts Candidate 2 rather than Candidate 1, it has an asset. In
particular, on Candidate 2, massive perceptual deception needn’t threaten memory
justification. Since perception feeds beliefs into memory, perceptual deception can
make memory unreliable. Still, memory can remain conditionally reliable and able
to justify. Memory justification is securer if reliabilism predicts Candidate 2.19
If reliabilism predicts Candidate 2, it does so uniquely. But is Candidate 2
accurate? In order to answer this question we must address two others: what
determines which process is relevant? And, how do we confirm that the relevant
process is conditionally reliable—that it satisfies CR1? The first of these questions
introduces reliabilism’s dreaded generality problem: we need a principled way
to identify the relevant process that forms any particular belief, so that we can
test reliabilism’s implications about justification in each case against our intuitive
judgments.20 While no adequate solution to this problem has been defended,
perhaps one exists. Still, I point out two main difficulties with predicting and
confirming Candidate 2.
Point 1: Developing a predicted interpretation of Candidate 2 is not only
challenging, but also methodologically non-naturalistic in a way. Here is why. In
order to confirm that Candidate 2 is accurate, we must interpret it as specifying a
particular process type as relevant in each type of ordinary retrieval case, so that we
can confirm the conditional reliability of that process. A reliabilism that solves the
generality problem entails a complete interpretation of Candidate 2. And we must
be able to confirm that Candidate 2, so interpreted, is accurate.
19Goldman’s (1979: 14, 2011: 278) reliabilism predicts Candidate 2. Lyons (2009: 177) however
develops an untraditional reliabilism that predicts Candidate 1 instead. Unfortunately, his view
robs reliabilism of the asset I mention above. Since Lyons’ (2013) reliabilism keeps with tradition,
however, I draw on that work below.
20See Conee and Feldman (1998) and Feldman (1985).
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In the interests of making a prediction, the solution must not be designed to entail
this complete interpretation of Candidate 2. (This makes solving the generality prob-
lem even harder.) But without this design we eschew a naturalistic methodology!
Recall that, according to Kornblith, externalist methodology is naturalistic in that it
investigates the characteristics underlying actual, clearly justified beliefs, and then
uses some of the observed characteristics to construct a theory of justification. The
theory is designed to entail that justified beliefs have the observed characteristics.
It follows that the theory does not predict that the beliefs have the characteristics.
If the characteristics were selected via examining ordinary retrieval cases, then the
theory of justification does not make predictions about these cases.
Of course, it could be that a fairly general process type is relevant in ordinary
retrieval cases, and that we can identify this process by looking at cases other
than ordinary retrieval. But this is unlikely. It’s not as if ordinary retrieval cases
are simply instances of, say, carefully believing. Many beliefs in ordinary retrieval
cases involve automatic endorsement, leaving no room for care. Beliefs in ordinary
retrieval cases seem to constitute a special class that is not fruitfully subsumed under
another.
In short, a reliabilist theory that solves the generality problem by examining
actual justified beliefs will not predict an interpretation of Candidate 2, and thus
will help establish P2. A reliabilist theory that solves the generality problem without
examining actual justified beliefs loses some naturalistic credentials. There is ten-
sion between predicting Candidate 2 and pursuing certain naturalistic methodology.
This is an unsettling result for the many reliabilists who value their theory’s alleged
special affinity with that methodology.
Now, supposing we can identify the relevant process in each ordinary retrieval
case, which belief outputs can we look at in order to determine whether that process
is conditionally reliable, and so assess Candidate 2’s accuracy? Reliabilism’s best
hope is that the data from metacognition research supports the conditional reliability
of each relevant process.
Point 2: Yet the data does not support this. Here is why. According to CR1,
a conditionally reliable process is one that generally produces true beliefs when
all belief inputs are true. Consequently, if a token belief-dependent process has a
single false belief input, its true outputs are not evidence of the process’ conditional
reliability. Only outputs of processes where all belief inputs are true could be
evidence of conditional reliability. So, only those token processes could be evidence
for Candidate 2’s accuracy.
In order to check whether there is this evidence, it would help to have a sense of
what counts as a belief input. Few reliabilists offer guidance. When Goldman (1979:
13–14) originally introduces the ideas of conditional reliability and belief-dependent
processes, he gives two examples of belief inputs: a stored memory belief, and a
premise in an inference. But he does not characterize inputs in general. He does
say (1979: 11) that “when we say that belief is caused by a given process . . . we
may interpret that to mean that it is caused by the particular inputs to the process.”
However, this states only that all inputs are causes of the output. It doesn’t state
which causal beliefs count as belief inputs.
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Jack Lyons (2013: 12) characterizes belief inputs more explicitly: any belief,
even a tacit belief, on which the output belief is causally or counterfactually
dependent.21 That is, suppose a belief-dependent belief formation process yields
a belief that q for S, and the process wouldn’t have if S had not (tacitly) believed r.
S’s belief that r counts as an input to the process that formed S’s belief that q. Note
that this counts an extraordinary number of beliefs as inputs in cases where there
are any. If, for example, I didn’t believe I exist, I wouldn’t believe I am sitting. So
my belief that I exist counts as an input to the process that formed my belief that I
am sitting. And, for example, I would not believe that Ms. Tardy will be late to the
party if I didn’t (tacitly) believe that she is not already there, that she will be coming
to the party at all, that she is still alive, that the party will continue, that I exist, etc.
Unfortunately for reliabilism, a non-trivial percent of our (tacit) beliefs are false.
What’s more, what we retrieve depends often on one or more particular false beliefs,
namely, beliefs associated with various memory biases.22 Given this and Lyons’
extremely permissive view about which beliefs count as inputs, it is overwhelmingly
likely that at least one input to any given token belief-dependent process is false.
So the truth-value of the output beliefs in ordinary retrieval cases will not verify
Candidate 2. On CR1, reliabilism does not imply that a conditionally reliable
process with a false belief input still tends to have true outputs.
It might seem that we have inductive evidence of Candidate 2’s accuracy. In
observed ordinary retrieval cases the beliefs tend to be true, even though they
typically result from a process with some false belief input. That gives us reason to
suppose that in the unobserved ordinary retrieval cases—including those in which
all belief inputs are true—the belief outputs tend to be true.
Perhaps it is ordinarily reasonable to conclude via induction that a process
with mostly true outputs and with some false inputs is conditionally reliable. But
the relevant process in ordinary retrieval cases is one that produces a belief by
significantly altering the contents of its inputs, including its belief inputs. Memory
alters these inputs considerably at three stages, and this often results in changes
in truth-value (see Frise (2018) and Michaelian (2011)). Yet the alteration helps
memory yield true beliefs. It’s not at all clear what will happen if all the belief inputs
are true. Are the output contents nonetheless adjustments of the input contents? If so,
then the process may very well not tend to get the truth. Also, it could be that our
false beliefs associated with our memory biases help us to get at the truth. These
beliefs are typical inputs. Eliminating them may notably lower the ratio of true
21Cf. Lyons (2013: 28) and Conee and Feldman (1998: 26–7, n.13). I see no non-ad hoc reason to
restrict input beliefs to those held by the subject. S1’s forming a belief that p may be causally or
counterfactually dependent on S2’s belief that q (e.g., via testimony), and so it seems S2’s belief
that q would count as an input to the process that formed S1’s belief that p. This has strange results.
22These beliefs concern consistency bias (whereby one reconstructs the past too similarly to one’s
view of the present), change bias (whereby one views oneself in the past too differently, in order
to redeem an investment), hindsight bias (whereby one attributes present knowledge to one’s past
self), and egocentric memory bias (whereby one inflates one’s present self-image by distorting
one’s past self-image); see Schacter (2001: Chap. 6).
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outputs. So it is questionable to reason inductively about the conditional reliability
of the relevant processes in ordinary retrieval. It is unclear what they would tend to
produce, given all true belief inputs.
In the absence of a promising alternative view about what counts as a belief input,
we have little reason to believe that Candidate 2 is accurate. Of course, we could
replace CR1 with a more liberal view about conditional reliability. For example:
CR2. A process R is conditionally reliable iff R mostly produces true beliefs when at least
most of R’s belief inputs are true.
On CR2, even if it is likely that some belief inputs to a token process are false, we
can still confirm the conditional reliability of that process type as long as most belief
inputs are true and the output is true. And most belief inputs in the typical ordinary
retrieval case are true. Since the output is typically true, it appears that, on CR2, we
have strong evidence that Candidate 2 is accurate.
CR2 seems attractive. A process that manages to be truth-conducive even while
disadvantaged by false belief inputs seems at least as good as a process that is
truth-conducive only when all belief inputs are true. However, CR2 does not help
reliabilism. On CR2, the wrong processes will (or won’t) count as conditionally
reliable, and therefore capable (or incapable) of justifying. Here is just one important
example.
One process that should be capable of justifying is moderate conjunction. This
process takes five or more beliefs as inputs, but not many more, and produces a belief
in the conjunction of their contents. When the inputs are S’s belief that p1, S’s belief
that p2, . . . S’s belief that p5, moderate conjunction produces in S a belief that (p1
and p2 and . . . p5). Unfortunately for reliabilism, CR2 counts moderate conjunction
as conditionally unreliable. Suppose most belief inputs to moderate conjunction are
true. If there are five input beliefs, at least three are true. More often than not, at least
one of the remaining beliefs is false. After all, the two remaining beliefs could have
several combinations of truth-values. On all but one combination, at least one belief
is false. So, the output—the belief in the conjunction—will tend to be false, when
most inputs are true. According to CR2 the process is conditionally unreliable, and
therefore incapable of justifying. Yet, when all belief inputs are justified, moderate
conjunction seems to be a paradigm of a justifying belief-dependent process of
belief formation!
This may prompt us to look for an account of conditional reliability that lies
between CR1 and CR2. But wherever the account lies, it faces problems. Suppose
the account swings closer to CR1, and requires for conditional reliability that most
outputs are true when at least 90% of belief inputs are true. As we near CR1, it
becomes harder to see that actual instances of ordinary retrieval are evidence that
the relevant process type is conditionally reliable. It’s not clear that at least 90% of
the inputs to the relevant process are true in actual cases of ordinary retrieval. So the
account does not support Candidate 2’s accuracy. And if the account swings closer
to CR2 and selects a lower percentage, it becomes easier for moderate conjunction
to fail to count as both conditionally reliable and capable of justifying, and so
the account seems false. Accounts that swing toward the middle of the road and
mjfrise@gmail.com
104 M. Frise
select a percentage nearer to 75% face both problems to some extent. And accounts
that concern instead the truth of all belief inputs of a certain quality—e.g., the
pertinent ones—face a different problem. They must predict (entail without being
so designed) which inputs have that quality, for any ordinary retrieval case. At any
rate, it is significant if reliabilists must replace CR1.
In short, we have insufficient evidence that Candidate 2 is an accurate prediction.
In too many ordinary retrieval cases, the process that forms the justified belief has
some false belief as an input. On the best view of conditional reliability, only a
process’ performance, when all its belief inputs are true, matters. A general lesson
here is this. To the extent that reliabilism theorizes about justification from content-
modifying belief formation processes that usually have some false belief inputs,
there is no clear way to confirm or to disconfirm reliabilism.
The preceding also shows that reliabilism does not even predict:
Candidate 3. Most of the justified beliefs in ordinary retrieval cases are true.
Reliabilism implies that justifying processes that involve metacognition and mem-
ory need only be conditionally reliable. So it is compatible with reliabilism that most
justified beliefs in ordinary retrieval cases are false (if, e.g., most of the relevant
processes producing the justified beliefs have a false belief input).
We might also consider:
Candidate 4. All belief inputs to the justified belief in an ordinary retrieval case are justified.
Reliabilism seems to predict this. On reliabilism, the output of a conditionally
reliable belief-dependent process is justified when all belief inputs to that process are
justified. Unfortunately for reliabilism, we have no test for Candidate 4’s accuracy,
not even from research on metacognition. One reason for this is our ignorance of
exactly what all those particular belief inputs are in a given case. If Lyons’ view
of belief inputs is correct, in any ordinary retrieval case there are numerous (tacit)
belief inputs, and we have too little information to determine that all are justified.
Moreover, it seems doubtful that all the belief inputs are justified. This is because
there are so many inputs, and we have a nontrivial amount of unjustified beliefs, and
our beliefs associated with our memory biases appear to be regular unjustified inputs
in ordinary retrieval. If this is correct, Candidate 4 seems false. And if Candidate 4
is false, reliabilism is false, since reliabilism predicts it. What’s more, reliabilism
leads to a kind of skepticism if Candidate 4 is false: few actual beliefs in ordinary
retrieval cases are justified.
The failure of these leading candidates establishes P2. What about P1? Does
reliabilism also predict Candidate 0? No defended reliabilist theory does. But
one could change that. However, it is hard to see why one would, unless one
simply wanted a theory with the same relevant implications that explanationist
evidentialism has—a theory designed to entail Candidate 0. So, the theory would
merely accommodate and not predict Candidate 0. Explanationist evidentialism still
uniquely, accurately predicts it. P1 stands.
Reflection on Candidate 0 may raise a new doubt about P2, however. Some
philosophers defend evidentialist versions of reliabilism. On these versions, all
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subjects have evidence for their justified beliefs. The subject’s belief is justified
because it is based on certain evidence, and the process of basing that belief on this
evidence is (conditionally) reliable.23 Evidentialist reliabilism predicts:
Candidate 0*. In each ordinary retrieval case, the relevant process that forms the subject’s
justified belief is the process of basing that belief on the subject’s evidence, and that process
is conditionally reliable.
If Candidate 0* is accurate, then P2 is false; a form of reliabilism would have a
unique accurate prediction in ordinary retrieval cases. But Candidate 0* is just an
elaboration of Candidate 2, which states that in each ordinary retrieval case, the
relevant process that forms the subject’s justified belief is conditionally reliable.
Candidate 0* specifies the relevant process. But we failed to confirm Candidate 2.
The data from metacognition does not confirm the conditional reliability of any
relevant process, not even the process of basing belief on the subject’s evidence.
Likewise, we cannot confirm Candidate 0*. So, P2 stands.
7.5 Conclusion
I conclude that ordinary retrieval cases support evidentialism better than reliabilism.
This rebuts common but mistaken views about evidentialism and internalism’s
standing with respect to the epistemology of memory, data on metacognition, and
naturalized epistemology.24
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